A Tale of Two Rivers by Rose, Carol M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 6 
1993 
A Tale of Two Rivers 
Carol M. Rose 
Yale Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Natural Resources 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carol M. Rose, A Tale of Two Rivers, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1623 (1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss6/36 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
A TALE OF TWO RIVERS 
Carol M. Rose* 
THE GREEN CATHEDRAL: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AMAZONIA. By Juan de Onis. New York: Oxford University Press. 
1992. Pp. xiv, 280. $24.95. 
NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE WATERS 
OF NEW ENGLAND. By Theodore Steinberg. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 284. $34.50. 
From the titles of these books, you might not guess that they are 
both about rivers. The first, not surprisingly, is about the Amazon. 
The second is about the Merrimack. 
The what? Yes, that's right, the Merrimack, and an important 
river it was, too, in its day. Theodore Steinberg's1 fascinating new 
book is one of a growing number of environmental histories, following 
the trail marked out in such wonderful studies as William Cronon's 
Changes in the Land2 about the New England colonies' evolving envi-
ronment, or Arthur McEvoy's The Fisherman's Problem 3 on the suc-
cession of fishing ecologies of California. In the Merrimack, Steinberg 
has located exactly the right river to take up the environmental issues 
lurking behind early nineteenth-century industrial development. 
For infrastructure fans like this reviewer, Nature Incorporated will 
be a tremendously exciting book, full of news about such things as 
flashboards and fishladders and water company organization. Even to 
less fervid devourers of this kind of information, the book will clearly 
send a message about why the Merrimack is still important: it pro-
vides an objective lesson on what can happen to the surrounding envi-
ronment when people set out to develop just one natural resource and 
do not think about the others. In the case of the Merrimack, that 
resource was water power. 
Most of Steinberg's book concerns the way the Merrimack was ef-
fectively colonized by a group of New England entrepreneurs known 
collectively as Boston Associates, who were primarily interested in the 
• Fred A. Johnston Professor of Property and Environmental Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 
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1. Theodore Steinberg is Professor of History at University of Michigan. 
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OF NEW ENGLAND (1983). 
3. ARTHUR F. MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: EcOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALI-
FORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980 (1986). 
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river's ability to supply power to textile mills. They first learned a few 
lessons from the early industrialization along the Charles River, in 
what is now the Boston suburb of Waltham. Then, in the 1820s they 
moved north to the Merrimack, embarking on the ambitious project 
that would eventually become a complex network of dams, canals, and 
mills at Lowell, Massachusetts (pp. 59-69). With Lowell well under-
way, they moved upstream on the Merrimack to Manchester, New 
Hampshire, and then downstream to Lawrence, Massachusetts, where 
their affiliates built still more mills and more massive river "improve-
ments" (pp. 82-84). Finally, recognizing the Merrimack mills' vulner-
ability to potential disruptions on the waters upstream, in the 1840s 
and the following years they and their affiliated water companies grad-
ually took over the key points along the river all the way to its sources 
in New Hampshire, building dams to store water and hence power for 
the downstream operations (pp. 107-13). The result of all these water-
works was a controlled flow from top to bottom, from the Merri-
mack's mountain headwaters down to the sea, sufficiently rationalized 
so that the Boston Associates and their affiliates could precisely spec-
ify the units of water power that they used themselves, or that they 
leased to other mills along the route (pp. 85-86). 
But there were some other results as well, results that figured 
rather less prominently in the Boston Associates' balance sheets: their 
dams and mills flooded pasturage lands (pp. 114-15, 126); decimated 
fish populations (pp. 172-74); slowed logging transport (p. 121); at-
tracted urban growth that polluted the river waters (pp. 232-39); and, 
incidentally, fueled the fires of local resentment, particularly among 
the New Hampshire residents far upstream from the Boston Associ-
ates' big Massachusetts textile factories (pp. 99-102). 
What was the reason for this heedless devastation of environmen-
tal resources? Though he doesn't beat the reader to death with these 
matters, Steinberg alludes constantly to a major theme, accompanied 
by a minor theme. The major theme is that the Merrimack's develop-
ers adopted an aggressively instrumental attitude about nature, 4 an at-
titude that by the end of the century had been adopted even by the 
opponents to their river projects (p. 267). The minor (and related) 
theme is that all this instrumentalism was encapsulated in too great a 
reliance on private property.5 
Let me say this again: I loved this book, as only one who pours 
over old pictures of milldams and waterwheels can love such a book. 
But I do not think that Steinberg's explanatory themes advance his 
otherwise entirely absorbing account, and I wish he had let them go, 
so to speak, as water over the dam. I am going to tum to those 
themes, and what I regard as their flaws, with the caveat that readers 
4. E.g., pp. 75, 203, 245. 
5. E.g., pp. 168, 196, 203. 
May 1993] A Tale of Two Rivers 1625 
should not be deterred from reading this fine book by the nitpicking 
that follows. 
To start with the major theme, all that aggressive instrumentalism: 
well, who wasn't instrumental? Steinberg begins his narrative well af-
ter various settlers had already headed up the Merrimack. Who 
among them had thought about nature as a Ding an sich? Nobody, 
that's who. 
Before the dam builders were the loggers and farmers. Forget 
about the loggers; their environmental lapses make them too easy a 
target. How about the farmers? Well, farms may look nice and green 
but, as our contemporaries in Brazil are learning right now (of which 
more shortly), farmers are not necessarily the friends of the environ-
ment. In fact, from the point of view of the native flora and fauna, 
farmers might as well have turned Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
- and now Brazil - into a big parking lot. Farmers chop down trees. 
They disrupt water flows. They plow up the soil and let it blow away 
as dust or run off into the rivers, where it kills both plant and animal 
marine life. They sow nonnative plants that escape and grow like 
crazy in the absence of natural predators. They bring in exotic ani-
mals like pigs, who root around and destroy what is left of the native 
habitat. Then, for fun, they go hunting and blow away any remaining 
"varmints" like wild turkeys, wolves, foxes, and bears. 
Yes, yes, I exaggerate. But consider an example: in wetlands pres-
ervation, a modern ecological icon, farmers are not the environmental 
good guys. They line up alongside the condominium developers, oil 
developers, and the old Army Corps of Engineers as diggers, plowers-
under, and general shock troops of ecological sterility. 6 Or consider 
another example: in states that care about prairie restoration, the sites 
for new prairies may well be located on places with names like Shoe 
Factory Road, 7 and they may take their native grass seeds from -
guess what - old industrial locations, rather like the ones that Stein-
berg discusses. Some of those places went from boom to bust without 
ever getting around to plowing under the native vegetation - unlike 
their farmer neighbors, who could not wait to bust that sod. 8 
So much for farmers. Who was there before the farmers? What 
about the Native Americans? Well, a certain cheerful practicality is 
starting to filter into our picture of the environmental consciousness of 
6. See, e.g., Frank Graham Jr., Of Broccoli and Marshes, AUDUBON, July 1990, at 102-06 
(mentioning and showing pictures of all these parties' activities, though the Army Corps now is 
trying to "get religion" on the environmental front). 
7. See Stevenson Swanson, Receding Prairie Gets Human Reseeding, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 17, 
1989, § 2, at 1, 5 (discussing "Shoe Factory Road" prairie restoration). 
8. See, e.g., Wayne Baker, Why Not Spend a Day Restoring a Prairie, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 
1990, § 18, at 5 (West Chicago prairie project located in midst of industrial section, on land 
formerly belonging to railroad; land contains over 500 plant species along with butterflies, birds, 
etc., unlike most land, which was plowed under for farms in late 1800s). 
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these indigenous peoples. From other environmental historians, we 
know that Eastern Native Americans did some farming, though not so 
intensively as the European settlers.9 We also know that they used fire 
extensively to manage forest and grassland growth, particularly to at-
tract wildlife. IO Out West they started fires among the tall evergreens 
just to watch the trees explode, like giant natural fireworks.II We can 
take a good guess that, like other indigenous peoples, they extermi-
nated a number of animal species, particularly the large, dangerous 
predators. I2 Under the circumstances, this must have seemed like the 
reasonable thing to do, just as it did to more modern Bengali forest-
dwellers, who had lots of experience with elephants that trampled 
their crops and man-eating tigers that occasionally ripped down huts 
to get at the nice juicy people inside. I3 I daresay, dear reader, that 
after following the trail of clothing shreds, bones, and blood to retrieve 
the carcass of your spouse or your child, you too would have extermi-
nated those animals, just as soon as you could. 
In any event, we know that American indigenous peoples, however 
comfortably they settled into some kind of equilibrium with the sur-
rounding wildlife, and however many truly poetic emotions they ex-
pressed about the land and its creatures, I4 had some pretty 
unsentimental and instrumental attitudes about nature too. Some 
seemed quite willing to turn "nature" to commercial purposes - for 
instance, to hunt beaver for the European fur trade, in exchange for 
firearms, cutting implements, and other objects they thought useful. IS 
Out in California, indigenous tribes fell into heartbreaking and disas-
trous disputes with miners and other settlers about the water runoff, 
because the runoff was damaging the fish populations that the Califor-
9. CRONON, supra note 2, at 43, 48. 
10. STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND RU· 
RAL FIRE 74-76 (1982). Pyne gives many examples of other Indian uses offires, including broad-
cast fires to get rid of flies and mosquitos. Id. at 71-72; see also ALBERT E. COWDREY, THIS 
LAND, THIS SOUTH: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 14-15 (1983) (describing Eastern Native 
American use of fire to open landscape for deer and to encourage some trees rather than others); 
CRONON, supra note 2, at 49-51 (same).· 
11. PYNE, supra note 10, at 71· 72. 
12. COWDREY, supra note 10, at 12-13. 
13. See Paul Greenough, Naturae Ferae: Historical Notes on the Management of Wild Ani· 
mals in Colonial and Post-colonial South Asia, Draft Paper Delivered at the Conference on 
Common Property, Collective Action and Ecology, The Indian Institute of Science Center for 
Ecological Studies in Bangalore, India, at 7-12, 18-19, 21-29 (Aug. 19-20, 1991) (copy on file 
with author). 
14. For an attractive (if somewhat romantic) sample, see T.C. McLUHAN, ToucH THE 
EARTH (1971). 
15. See Toby Marantz, The Fur Trade and the Cree of James Bay, in OLD TRAILS AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS: PAPERS OF THE THIRD NORTH AMERICAN FUR TRADE CONFERENCE 39, 42 
(1980) (chart of goods traded in exchange for beaver, early eighteenth century). Marantz dis-
putes the view that the Cree became dependent on the fur trade and instead depicts the inland 
groups as controlling the terms of trade with Europeans. Id. at 55-57. 
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nia natives intended to eat. 16 Did they act from love of nature? Or 
was it love of having something to eat? Are those really distinguish-
able? The more important point, as Arthur McEvoy's book suggests, 
is that the California natives could in a certain sense be instrumental 
about fish, and still act in ways that were compatible with the preser-
vation of this important environmental resource. 17 That combination 
is what should make them interesting to modern environmentalists. 
So who isn't instrumental? And what can instrumentalism possi-
bly explain? Maybe the Boston Associates were "aggressively" instru-
mental but, to some degree, that was just a matter of an advancing 
technological capacity that enhanced their singlemindedness, in which 
case we should be talking about technology and singlemindedness, not 
"instrumentalism." Instrumentalism is extremely widespread, and it is 
not just a human phenomenon; if you want to see some really aggres-
sive instrumentalism, just watch a video of the way a bear hunts for 
fish. I say watch a video, because I don't want that bear to get instru-
mental about you. 
From one environmental perspective, the trick is not to get rid of 
instrumentalism, a hopeless task under most circumstances. Rather, 
the goal is to get people to understand instrumentalism in a wider con-
text. In other words, the task is to convince people to adhere to what 
used to be called "self-interest rightly understood," which in an envi-
ronmental context is now fashionably called "sustainable" resource 
use. This concept denotes a kind of enlightened instrumentalism; it 
requires one to think about adopting less intrusive and singleminded 
behavior with respect to the surrounding lands and waters, in order to 
preserve their various forms of productivity, including their contribu-
tion to an enhanced quality of life. 
Which brings me to the second theme that Steinberg at least half-
heartedly sounds: that the Merrimack development showed the inap-
propriateness of using private property (an instrument for the 
gratification of self-interest) as an institution of resource management. 
But again, from one very widely held environmental perspective, the 
problem was not too much property. The problem was not enough 
property. 
A number of environmental scholars, including historians like 
McEvoy, have pointed out that environmental problems are "com-
mons". problems - scenarios in which nobody owns a particular re-
source, and everybody consequently races to get the most first. 18 A 
standard solution to the commons problems is to reduce the resource 
in question to private property. When people know who has what, 
16. McEvoY, supra note 3, at 53-58. 
17. Id. at 48-49. 
18. Id. at 11-12; see also WILLIAM OPHULS, EcoLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 145-
47 (1977). 
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they will be careful about the things they own, and they will trade with 
other owners instead of grabbing and fighting and being intrusive. But 
some resources - like the oceans or the air - are not easily reduced 
to individual property; they are too big or have too many interacting 
parts. Dividing those resources into individual bits will not work out 
well, because the management of each bit may affect the others, 
through what the economists call "externalities" (another name for 
insufficiently defined property rights). 19 Maybe that is what Steinberg 
has in mind when he talks of the inadequacies of "private" property 
(pp. 168, 196, 203). 
But private property does not have to be individual property. A 
number of resource scholars of late, like Elinor Ostrom, have been 
making the point quite strenuously that private ordering can include 
communal property. In fact, they say, the world has known quite a 
few joint property arrangements designed to manage large-scale re-
sources, some of which are very sophisticated arrangements and well 
attuned to the preservation of the resources in question.20 Even when 
a resource is open to the public at large, the forms and intensity of 
public access can be managed, in which case the resource is properly 
called "public property," as opposed to something that is simply up 
for grabs.21 
Big interactive resources like river basins require something like 
this - that is, a larger-scale management of their interactive parts. In 
a sense, that was the genius of the Boston Associates, as Steinberg so 
fascinatingly illustrates. Limited though their vision may have been, 
they realized that the Merrimack's water power had to be managed as 
a whole, and that they could not really be secure in the downstream 
Massachusetts mills unless they controlled the flow from the upstream 
New Hampshire lakes. What is more, the Boston Associates figured 
out how to do this - how to bring the entire water power of the river 
under the management of a single interlocking directorate by treating 
the whole Merrimack as one big property.22 
To be sure, the Boston Associates focused on only one aspect of 
19. See Steven J. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive 
Resource, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 49, 49-54 (1970). 
20. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). Ostrom, like many 
writing in this area, carefully distinguished "open access" common pool resources from those 
with limited access, in order to make the point that a "commons" is not necessarily "tragic," but 
can also be managed if access is limited. Id. at 48; see also S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. 
Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J, 
713 (1975). 
21. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 742-47 (1986) (arguing that public property can be managed, 
even by informal custom). 
22. The courts also realized this in developing a concept of "reasonable use" to accommodate 
riparian owners along a whole stream. See Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realign-
ment of Common-Law Property Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 266-67 (1990). 
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the river, that is, its usefulness for power; they were more or less indif-
ferent to its other uses.23 Nevertheless, they did have to pay attention 
to at least some of the other uses of the river. Why? Because some 
other people had property rights to use the river in other ways. In 
order to overcome the property rights belonging to others, the Boston 
Associates had to spend money. If their projects flooded lands, the 
Associates had to buy flooding easements or buy the land outright, 
and when they failed to do so, they faced litigation, damage judg-
ments, and (in New Hampshire) self-help remedies by irate dam bust-
ers (pp. 148-50). They also had to buy out fishing rights or build 
gadgetry to let the fish get over the dams (pp. 174-75). They had to 
pay for wharf extensions when their dam releases disrupted boating 
facilities (p. 265). And so on and so on. All these payments and ef-
forts had to be made to extinguish property rights, both private and 
public. Those rights, in turn, made water power more expensive to 
develop and forced the Boston Associates, in effect, to evaluate the 
worth of their own projects against other actual and potential uses of 
the river. 
In short, property rights made the Boston Associates think twice 
before mucking about with at least a few aspects of the environment, 
paltry as those impediments now seem. The enormous vacuum in 
property rights, both private and public, when combined with the in-
sufficient protection of existing rights, allowed these industrialists to 
decimate the environment without a care in the world. What they 
never (or at most sporadically) bothered to take into account were the 
public fishing interests that went largely undefended, the water pollu-
tion that no one really quite understood as damaging to anyone, and 
the scenery that no one thought of as belonging to anyone at all, 
whether individually, communally, or as members of the public at 
large. 
That was the problem: what nobody owns gets taken "for free." 
This will likely happen when "instrumentalists" encounter valuable 
but unowned resources: it is the stage for the tragedy of the commons, 
the play that had such a long run on the unowned aspects of the Mer-
rimack's environment. The tragedy is especially notable when con-
trasted with the aspects of the river that did get treated as property, 
particularly the water power that the Boston Associates learned to 
measure and parcel out to purchasers. That "propertized" aspect of 
the river was treated with deliberate care and with the thrifty hus-
banding of resources that all too easily illustrates the classical econo-
mists' tribute to property: property induces prudence, planning, 
investment, and attention to resources, because property lets the own-
23. Steinberg makes clear, however, that a secondary purpose for riverine mill location was 
waste disposal - a use that resulted in serious pollution. See pp. 211-16. 
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ers bear the costs and take the gains from their decisions. 24 
Interestingly enough, the end of the Merrimack's water power 
story represented a reversion to indigenous resource management 
practice. In many parts of the world, indigenous peoples manage re-
sources in a very simple way: they move on when the desired resource 
becomes scarce and requires more expenditure of effort so that other 
resource-producing grounds start to look relatively more attractive.25 
Much the same scenario occurred with industrial power sources. By 
the later years of the nineteenth century, the Merrimack's most easily 
developed and accessible mill sites had already been developed. Then 
what? Why, the industrialists shifted to another energy source - an-
thracite coal, newly developed in the area around Scranton, Penn-
sylvania. By the 1880s, only a few years after the Boston Associates 
had finally consolidated their water control in the New Hampshire 
headwaters, coal-burning steam engines began to displace water as an 
energy source (pp. 244-45). 
Unlike water power, coal-powered steam engines could be used 
just about anywhere, and that alone made them attractive. Indeed, 
given what Steinberg teaches us about the intrusiveness of water power 
facilities, coal may have even seemed comparatively benign with re-
spect to the environment, though perhaps no one should bet on this. 
In any event, any such hopes would have occurred a few years before 
the ground started to collapse in and around Scranton, as the underly-
ing anthracite mines caved in below, sucking down residences, schools, 
graveyards, and other facilities in a kind of protracted horror show 
whose legal culmination arrived in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon. 26 
This depicts a recurring pattern with resource use: we use a re-
source until it is exhausted, or at least has become relatively expensive, 
and then we move along to the next. 27 That might be fair enough if 
the whole story was about resources that we bought. It often happens, 
though, that by the time we move on, not only have we depleted the 
resource that we were paying for, but we may have also completely 
24. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 
pt. 1, chs. 7-9 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931). 
25. See, e.g., CRONON, supra note 2, at 48-49 (New England Indians farmed same areas until 
the ground became infertile, then moved; they also moved on when wood for fires became 
scarce). 
26. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The case held unconstitutional, as a "taking" of property, Penn-
sylvania's effort to limit mining companies from undermining various surface uses, even when the 
mining companies had purchased or retained the right to do so. The effects of subsidence are 
graphically depicted in some of the case's briefs, particularly the Brief of Defendants in Error at 
6-8, and Brief on Behalf of the City of Scranton at 2-5; the latter has photographs of some 
dramatic surface collapses. For another contemporary account, see George H. Cushing, Near-
Doomed Cities, 19 TECHNICAL WORLD MAG. 660 (1913), describing the rabbit warren of coal 
shafts under the surface of Scranton, threatening the city with surface collapse. 
27. See generally Stephen F. Williams, Running Out: The Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1978); see id. at 181-85, 197 for some of the ethical considerations. 
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wasted some other related resources that we didn't have to pay for. 
These attached but unowned "commons" resources are likely to reach 
a point of exhaustion much more quickly, and much more devastat-
ingly, because nobody even has bothered to think about the benefits of 
moderation or regeneration with respect to them. If these resources 
are unowned and open to everyone, nobody directly pays the costs of 
overuse, and nobody directly reaps the benefits from conservation; 
thus, nobody is very likely to bother about them. To be sure, the Mer-
rimack mills moved from water power to coal, but not until the own-
ers had pondered the relative costs of these alternative sources of 
power. They never even had to think about the resources that nobody 
owned, like scenery or water purity. And so they wasted them. 
Nowadays, people don't pay nearly as much attention to the Mer-
rimack as they did back in the days when Lowell could be compared 
to England's then-dominant industrial city of Manchester.28 But lots 
of people are thinking about the Amazon, which looks like another 
environmental disaster waiting to happen, and for very much the same 
reasons. Juan de Onis' Green Cathedraf29 kicks us straight into the 
later years of the twentieth century, but he too is telling a "commons" 
story, albeit a more complicated one, as befits one of the greatest wa-
tersheds of the world. 
De Onis' story is not so clearly focused on the river system's water 
power, although dams and water power do play a significant role in 
the book. 30 De Onis devotes much more time to a variety of other 
watershed resources, not the least of which are contained in the great 
rainforests, with their prodigious flora and fauna. Perhaps because of 
the huge reach and variety of this watershed, de Onis' book itself has a 
riverine quality, as the subjects tumble out and dissolve into one an-
other. Two or three topics often fall over each other in the same para-
graph; certain organizations and firms pop up all over the book 
without cross-references; and side remarks digress to such nifty trivia 
as the love life of a former president's aide (p. 178) or the movie royal-
ties paid to an Amazon guerilla's widow (p. 229). It is all very inter-
esting, but I wish the effort had gone into a few more good maps, like 
Steinberg's very helpful ones. 
Through this rush, de Onis' book strongly suggests that in 
Amazonia, too, certain matters ought to be treated as one great big 
property, since events in the rainforest have highly interactive effects 
on the world's biodiversity and carbon dioxide levels. And, once 
28. COITON WAS KING. A HISTORY OF LOWELL, MASSACHUSETfS 90, 117, 239 (Arthur 
L. Eno, Jr. ed., 1976). The comparison often favored Lowell, since it had Jess slumlike condi-
tions for workers. 
29. Juan de Onis is a former foreign correspondent for the New York Times who undertook 
an intensive two-year study of the Amazon in 1988. 
30. E.g., p. 123. 
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again, locating an appropriate manager for such a great big property is 
not so easy. In the meantime, Amazonia is beset by hordes. 
Unlike Steinberg, de Onis exhibits no romantic notions about na-
ture as an entity unto itself, separate from the opportunists who poke 
around in it. His Amazonia is full of people, some indigenous, and 
many more newcomers, almost all recognizably instrumentalists. The 
oldtimers are native peoples and, somewhat more recently, rubber tap-
pers - all users of the old-growth rainforest and its products.31 The 
newcomers have rather different ideas: they include miners tearing up 
the forest, energy firms looking for oil in it, farmers and ranchers 
clearing it by slash and bum, and publicly supported entrepreneurs 
building dams (yes, dams) across its waterways. Needless to say, a lot 
of these newcomers (and even some of the indigenous peoples (p. 134)) 
are busily reenacting the tragedy of the commons - a result that is 
particularly likely to occur, as de Onis quite correctly points out, 
under the too-frequent conditions of weak social order and violence.32 
Nothing works better than the threat of violence to usher in the regime 
of sauve qui peut, where the most rational plan is to grab and run 
before someone else outgrabs and outruns you. 
What, then, can induce all these tragedians to work together to-
ward some common and conservationist approach to the Amazon's 
gigantic interactive resources? In a variety of ways, de Onis' book im-
plies two guiding principles. First, to save Amazonia's resources, the 
region needs social organization, so its resources can be managed in a 
coordinated way. Second, and just as important, everybody has to get 
a piece of the action - that is to say, all the Amazon's vastly different 
kinds of people have to get some individual or community properties, 
in order to give them a stake in maintaining the common program, 
rather than sabotaging it by individual grab-and-run actions. 
So far, so good; this suggests a common management regime to 
handle this great, big, interactive area as if it were a single property, 
while assuaging the huge numbers of people who might be in a posi-
tion to tum it back into a quickly wasted commons. The next question 
is, who is in a position to deliver such a social system? Who or what 
can articulate the many and diverse interests into a larger enterprise of 
sustainable development, in what de Onis dubs a "new frontier"? One 
might think that the only management agency large enough for the job 
is government, but de Onis is quite contemptuous of many direct gov-
ernmental institutions in the Amazon basin (pp. 191-92). Instead, 
31. De Onis is rather skeptical of some of the efforts to treat these "peoples of the forests" -
particularly the rubber tappers - as privileged holders of rights on "extractive reserves." See 
pp. 224-29, 236-38. 
32. Pp. 19-20. A recent example is playing out in Cambodia as this review is written. See 
Philip Shenon, Now It's the Jungle That the Khmer Rouge Decimates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, 
§ 4, at 4 (describing savaging of forests, topsoil degradation, through logging and gem mining in 
rebel-held areas). 
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what he suggests, interestingly enough, is that a leading role be taken 
on by the big privately or publicly supported entrepreneurships - that 
is, the Amazon's versions of the Merrimack's Boston Associates.33 
These major entrepreneurial organizations already have involved 
themselves in mineral extraction, hydroelectric development, and for-
estry products. De Onis argues that they have been much more con-
servationist than their teeming, small-scale, individual counterparts, 34 
particularly the extraordinarily destructive wildcat miners (pp. 67-69). 
They have also been much more ready to entertain such efforts as re-
forestation on their properties, according to de Onis; he spends lots of 
time talking about the way the major state mining enterprise replanted 
eucalyptus trees when it ran out of other trees for cellulose products 
(pp. 166-69). Besides, he says, these major firms are the only ones 
capable of generating the social organization needed for wide-reaching 
efforts (p. 163). 
One has to be a bit skeptical of all this, for reasons that should be 
clear from a little reflection on the Boston Associates and the Merri-
mack. First, when it comes to environmental resources that they do 
not have to pay for, there is no reason to think that these large-scale 
Amazonian enterprisers are much more broadminded than the Boston 
Associates used to be. As de Onis observes, a reforestation project 
doesn't sound all that attractive when one can cut down the existing 
trees for nothing (p. 99). Second, it must give one pause to consider 
the conservation efforts that these firms have in fact undertaken. So 
far, for example, eucalyptus trees seem to be a major element in refor-
estation (pp. 199-200) but, quite aside from the inability of these trees 
to replace the habitat diversity of the old growth, they are a very hardy 
brand of exotic. Exotics have a distressing habit of crowding out na-
tive vegetation. Just ask Californians about eucalyptus trees. While 
you are at it, ask South Carolinians about the kudzu vine, another 
exotic plant that, as de Onis approvingly notes, some state agronomy 
programs have introduced among Amazon ranchers (pp. 211-13). 
By the way, these exotic replantings echo some of the nineteenth-
century efforts along the Merrimack that Steinberg describes, particu-
larly those relating to fish replacement. On the Merrimack, the new 
industrial mill dams severely disrupted fish migrations and reproduc-
tion, and New Englanders tried to restock the waters with hatchery-
bred varieties. We now know, unfortunately, that hatchery fish can 
33. Lest it be forgotten, the Merrimack mills also had public support, at least in Massachu-
setts, in the form of the "mill acts" that effectively gave private eminent domain powers to the 
mills to flood their upstream neighbors on payment of damages. See Steinberg, pp. 31-32. New 
Hampshire had no such mill act for most of the nineteenth century (pp. 148-49), and they were 
controversial in other states as well, insofar as they assisted private uses of waterpower. See 
Rose, supra note 22, at 277-78 & n.57. 
34. E.g .• pp. 137-43. 
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have devastating effects on the gene pool of their wild relatives.35 The 
point is not that such second-best efforts should not be undertaken in 
all circumstances; it is just that these moves, like other optimistic 
technofixes, may have consequences that no one can anticipate.36 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even these big Amazonian 
enterprises scarcely have a prayer of achieving any all-encompassing 
unitary management over the gigantic Amazon ecosystem. Not one of 
them could dream of the kind of control over even a single aspect of 
Amazonia that the Boston Associates had over one aspect of the Mer-
rimack, that is, the river's power. Moreover, even on de Onis' "new 
frontier" in the Amazon, the competing enterprises aren't all big busi-
nesses. Despite the role he envisions for large enterprises, he insists 
(and probably quite rightly) that nothing is going to work unless there 
is a place for nongovernmental organizations, foresters' associations, 
agriculturalists, indigenous groups, and so on. 37 All of these groups 
and the interests behind them ought to be able to make a living out of 
the Amazon and its forests - if only, if only, if only everyone can be 
brought into a common picture. But to arrive at that happy state, they 
are going to need coordination by something even bigger than the 
large entrepreneurial organizations. 
No doubt this is why de Onis keeps up a steady drumbeat on the 
subject of "zoning." The word zoning appears all over the place in this 
book, and it hints at a kind of looming master plan that will allocate 
private efforts to the right places, all to achieve sustainable and envi-
ronmentally sound development. Unfortunately, de Onis does not say 
much about what is going to go into the different zones, or how they 
are going to get established, or by whom, or who is going to get to 
decide about rezoning in the future. 
These lapses will cause a general rolling of eyes among some land 
use experts. Zoning in the United States has been a major source of 
governmental corruption, 38 though perhaps this is not directly a pro-
pos since American zoning is largely a local affair rather than a cen-
tralized one. Nevertheless, the United States does have one'state with 
a history of highly centralized zoning, namely Hawaii, where every 
square foot is in some state-mandated land use district.39 Now, Ha-
waii is a diverse place, but not so diverse as the Amazonia that de Onis 
describes; it has the additional advantages of much smaller size and a 
35. See Michael L. Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid Stocks: A Call for 
Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENvrL. L. 111, 123-45 (1990). 
36. For more on technological optimism, see James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-
easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985). 
37. E.g., pp. 214, 219-27. 
38. See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 244-47 (1981), 
and sources cited therein. 
39. DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAII 1, 3, 6· 
10 (1984). 
May 1993] A Tale of Two Rivers 1635 
longer history of centralized administration. Moreover, given de Onis' 
own scathing criticisms of governmental actions in the Amazon basin, 
including the utterly dismal experience of the widely ransacked 
rainforest reserve districts (pp. 155, 183), it seems as if Hawaii's land 
use regime may justifiably enjoy more public confidence than Brazil's. 
But even with these advantages, the various decisionmakers in Ha-
waii's zoning system are under constant pressur~ to change the uses 
allowed in given zones, or to alter the boundaries themselves, or to 
open up the process to public observation, or to add more rigorous 
decisionmaking procedures, or to take greater account of the interests 
of this group or that.40 If Hawaii has problems with its version of 
centralized zoning, the problems entailed in zoning Amazonia must 
boggle the mind. One cannot but think that de Onis has reached a 
pretty desperate state if he is willing to fall back on a largely un-
described "zoning" as the coordinating mechanism for the new fron-
tier in the Green Cathedral - particularly given his descriptions of 
governmental bungling in other areas. 
None of this sounds terribly optimistic for the Amazon, p~rhaps 
even less so now than when de Onis wrote, given the political uncer-
tainties attending Brazil's ouster of President Collor. Indeed, one 
might guess that the Amazon's chances for environmental conserva-
tion are rather weaker than the Merrimack's were over a century ago. 
Are there any reasons for hope? Well, perhaps a few. One is the 
character of those who protest environmental decimation. Along 
Steinberg's Merrimack over a hundred years ago, the people we might 
now call NIMBY s sound like genuine crazies. I mean, real nut cases, 
like the Boston Associates' notorious stalker, James Worster, who 
would stop at nothing to blow up one of their dams (Steinberg, pp. 
128-31). Evidently, environmental protest was not an activity that 
sensible people even contemplated in those days. Nowadays, on the 
other hand, environmental protest has at least attained intellectual re-
spectability - it is an activity that sensible people can think about, 
engage in, and get some sympathy for. Brazil's indigenous peoples, 
after all, have been able to line up some impressive international sup-
port for their efforts to remain in a more or less intact rainforest (p. 
155). 
And that's another thing: a wider community has now taken an 
interest in preserving the Amazon's ecology, a point symbolized by the 
1992 Rio Conference. The Amazonian rainforest has effects that go 
far beyond the merely local; some say there is a worldwide interest in 
its hugely diverse biota, and others argue that its vegetation creates a 
"carbon sink," helping to prevent the overheating of the global atmos-
phere. Moreover, modem technologies such as remote satellite sens-
40. Id. at 36-41. 
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ing can help everyone keep abreast of events in the rain forest (pp. 94-
95), so that alterations in its conditions are widely and quickly knowa-
ble. Although the rest of the world may not be paying enough atten-
tion, at least it is paying some. Perhaps most important, the rest of the 
world is thinking about shelling out some bucks for conservation in 
Amazonia and, more particularly, for creating entitlements that en-
courage local people to preserve the Amazon's resources, with all their 
potentially massive global repercussions.41 It's about time, too; this is 
the sort of endeavor that property regimes should help us undertake. 
Which brings me back to the title. I called this review A Tale of 
Two Rivers, instead of "Tales" because, in a certain sense, both rivers 
run through a single tale. It is the same old story about the tragedy of 
the commons. Economic theorists say that the way to stop telling this 
story, over and over again, is to devise property solutions to resource 
uses. To be sure, new property solutions may require changes of con-
sciousness and other such high-falutin' epistemological events, but 
those do occur from time to time,42 and they should be quite compati-
ble with the more highly developed property regimes called for by en-
vironmental protection. Both these books suggest, at least to this 
reviewer, that environmental challenges are intellectual challenges of a 
quite specific sort. That is, they are challenges to reconsider the ways 
that all of us organize our thinking about property regimes, both pri-
vate and public, so as to advance our true interests with respect to the 
world around us. And if this takes a change of consciousness - well, 
these books, like the others in the new environmental history, are two 
good places to start. 
41. It may be symptomatic that two of the four articles in a recent newsletter of the Washing-
ton think tank, Resources for the Future, deal with property-based solutions to rainforest preser-
vation. See R. David Simpson & Roger A. Sedjo, Contracts far Transferring Rights to Indigenous 
Genetic Resources, RESOURCES (Resources for the Future, Wash., D.C.), Fall 1992, at 1; and 
Roger A. Sedjo, A Global Forestry Initiative, RESOURCES (Resources for the Future, Wash., 
D.C.), Fall 1992, at 16. A third article in this issue, interestingly enough, deals with a modern 
version of one of the Merrimack problems, fish depopulation from dams: Kris Wernstedt et al., 
Evaluating Alternatives for Increasing Fish Stocks in the Columbia River Basin, RESOURCES (Re-
sources for the Future, Wash., D.C.), Fall 1992, at 10. 
42. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative 
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 55-57 (1990). 
